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Abstract 
The main objective of this paper is to analyse the effect of electricity regulation on economic 
growth. Although the relationship between electricity consumption and economic growth has 
been extensively analysed in the empirical literature, this framework has not been used to 
estimate the effect of electricity regulation on economic growth. Understanding this effect is 
essential for the assessment of regulatory policy. Specifically, we assess the effects of two major 
areas of regulation, renewable energy promotion costs and network costs, on electricity 
consumption and growth. A dataset for the period 2007-2013 and 22 European countries was 
compiled based on CEER reports and EUROSTAT databases. The results of the empirical analysis 
show that the two regulation instruments have a negative effect on electricity consumption and 
economic growth and provide estimates of their effects on growth in quantitative terms.   
 







In the last decade it has become evident that the energy sector is at a turning point, a new model 
is required to face the challenges of the upcoming years. The required transformation of the 
traditional energy model, especially with regard to environmental effects, has led to an inevitable 
and profound regulatory reform. From a regulatory perspective, the energy sector has witnessed 
a high level of activity at the European level. Three consecutive packages were adopted aiming at 
harmonising and liberalising the European Union (EU) internal energy market. In addition, the 
climate and energy package set ambitious targets for 2020 in terms of emissions reduction, 
penetration of renewables and energy efficiency. Climate and energy as an integrated policy 
within the EU has led to the trilemma of targets: competitiveness, sustainability, and security of 
supply. More recently, the European Commission has defined the 2050 roadmap and the 2030 
targets as an intermediate step in energy and climate policy to achieve sustainable economic 
growth.  
Unfortunately, the objectives pursued by the climate and energy policy of the EU –environmental 
sustainability, security of supply and competitiveness- are difficult to achieve simultaneously and 
even more if they are supported by market forces only. Therefore, priorities need to be set. When 
the energy policy objectives are analysed in detail, it becomes apparent that the environmental 
dimension has played an important role. Nevertheless, the economic crisis and its undesirable 
effects on the capacity of European economies to grow and create wealth, has increased the 
attention on competitiveness as one of the main concerns in policy agenda. It is fundamental for 
industrial development and economic growth that European firms preserve or improve their 
competitiveness. Within this context -and keeping in mind the other energy policy objectives, 
since firms must compete in difficult environments-, the basic question is on the role of energy in 
operating costs and competitiveness. 
The increasing concern in Europe about the recent evolution of energy costs and prices and its 
impact on industrial competitiveness is evident in the 2014 EU Communication 'For a European 
Industrial Renaissance'.  Every day there is greater need to secure an affordable access to energy 
and raw materials, since these are an important part of the costs in many industries. As the 
evolution of energy costs negatively influences the competitiveness of energy intensive 
industries, it is fundamental to avoid disproportionate increases of those costs as a consequence 
of taxes, levies or other instruments introduced by Member States to enforce various policies. 
This is essential to guarantee a cost-effective relationship and contributes to an improvement in 
EU competitiveness. Therefore, the assumption of the upcoming objectives must follow a   cost 
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effective approach  -affordable and competitive-, ensuring  security of supply and sustainability, 
while taking into account the current economic and political context.   
The main objective of this paper is to analyse the effect of electricity regulation on economic 
growth. Understanding this effect is deemed essential for the assessment of regulatory policy. 
Specifically, we assess the effects of two major regulations, renewable energy promotion costs 
and industrial network cost, on electricity consumption and gross domestic product (GDP). In this 
analysis we assume that this impact takes place though the influence of regulation on electricity 
consumption.  
To carry out the empirical estimation, a database for the period 2007-2013 and 22 European 
countries has been compiled based on the EUROSTAT database and Council of European Energy 
Regulators (CEER) reports. The information for 22 countries and over 7 years allows us to have an 
appropriate panel of data. The contributions of this paper to the literature are as follows. First, 
instead of analysing the effects of regulation on economic growth directly, we use a system of 
two equations to take into account the fact that electricity regulation potentially affects economic 
growth through its impact on electricity consumption. This procedure helps to improve our 
understanding of the mechanisms regarding the effects of electricity regulation on growth. 
Second, many papers focus on only one specific instrument. Instead, we consider the two main 
regulatory instruments, renewable energy promotion costs and network costs so their effects can 
be compared. Third, to include both instruments has required the construction of a novel and 
comparable measure of renewable promotion costs for 22 European countries. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the background on the link we 
explore later in the empirical exercise between regulation, electricity consumption and economic 
growth. In Section 3 the model, variables and methods are described in detail. Section 4 details 
and discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, Section 5 provides the conclusions and 
policy implications derived from the analysis performed. 
 
2. BACKGROUND: REGULATION, ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Notwithstanding its relevance for the analysis of regulatory policies, the academic literature has 
devoted, with very few exceptions (Hudson and Jorgenson, 1974), little attention to the 
relationship between electricity regulation and economic growth. This is mainly attributable to 
the fact that this relationship is not a direct one, but rather it is mediated through the effect that 
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regulation has on the consumption of electricity. The mechanism at work in this relationship is 
the following; electricity is an economic factor of great relevance since it is a key input in the 
modern production process,  its consumption having a significant impact on a company’s 
production costs and, hence, on economic growth. Next, we provide background and 
fundamentals for our model based, first, on the link between regulation and electricity 
consumption, and second, on the relationship between electricity consumption and economic 
growth.  
2.1. Regulation and electricity consumption 
This research starts from the assumption that the price system is a useful mechanism to transmit 
relevant information which has an impact on consumer behaviour, within   the European context. 
Whether a depletion of an existing resource, an increasing scarcity of a non-renewable energy or 
an arbitrage opportunity in a particular market, all the relevant information is usually transmitted 
through the price, through variations in price levels that make agents react to the fluctuations by 
changing, for instance, their consumption.  
The electricity sector is characterised by being one of the most highly regulated sectors. In the 
framework of liberalisation, being pushed forward in January 1997 with the publication of EC 
Directive 96/92/EC of 19 December, the regulatory changes affecting the electricity sector have 
been especially intense and have had an enormous impact on the structure of the sector and its 
business agents, as well as on the functioning of the electricity market itself.  
Within this process, the regulatory function appears as a key element, being responsible for the 
definition of the framework that guarantees the correct technical management of the power 
system, the coordination of the networks and the transparency of access conditions for all the 
agents participating in the power market. In other words, in this process of liberalisation, 
competition and regulation represent two sides of the same coin. Real competition in power 
markets cannot be fully achieved without ensuring non-discriminatory network access and 
market functioning at the wholesale and retail levels. Economic regulation must guarantee the 
recovery of all regulated costs in order to ensure the economic viability of the power system. In 
this context, energy regulation has a significant economic impact, which has to be considered ex-
ante when designing energy policy initiatives. 
Evaluating the economic impact of the regulation of the electricity sector and of the changes in 
these regulations is a complex task. The assessment and measurement of the impact of the 
5 
 
reform processes and regulatory changes have been analysed in the relevant literature through 
various general approaches. 
The first is a macroeconomic approach focusing on the analysis of regulatory policies and their 
impact within the framework of general equilibrium theory (Chisari and Estache, 1999). 
Contributors using this approach constructed general equilibrium models in an attempt to 
capture first- and second-order effects to establish, identify and quantify transmission 
mechanisms and the overall effects of a specific regulatory policy or measure on economic 
growth, through the modelling of the behaviour of economic agents. The analysis of the impact 
of regulatory policies with general equilibrium models is intuitively attractive as it allows the 
quantification of both direct and indirect economic effects. However, these models are 
characterised by enormous complexity and the constraints placed on any formulation, 
implementation and description, given the need to simplify the hypotheses governing 
transmission mechanisms. This limitation undermines their use when the aim is to analyse the 
impact of specific actions in the regulatory domain. 
The second approach has involved the quantitative evaluation of a country’s regulatory 
framework. This provides a better understanding of the risks, particularly the regulatory ones. 
Such an evaluation of the regulatory framework is useful in a number of ways: it enables 
comparisons to be made; it identifies possible improvements; and it facilitates the evaluation of 
the impact of implementing new measures. The evaluation is not without its difficulties, however 
(Becker, 2009) since it requires access to measurable parameters that allow for an analysis of 
their evolution over time as well as a comparative analysis of regulatory frameworks. 
Given that all regulatory actions seek to achieve a significant improvement in the provision of an 
electric power supply, a third set of studies has attempted to assess the effects of regulatory 
changes based on the measurement and evaluation of outcomes – the so-called performance 
metrics approach – in terms of price, accessibility, quality and efficiency in the provision of the 
service (Cubbin and Stern, 2006; Pollitt, 2009). This approach has been widely used in academic 
studies to evaluate the impact of regulatory changes based on the results obtained in terms of 
pricing, consumption, investment, service quality or the evolution in greenhouse gas emissions, 
among others. The simplicity of this approach is both its main limitation and advantage. The main 
limitation is that, been essentially an approach to evaluate -ceteris paribus- direct effects on 
output metrics, it does not allow for the evaluation of multiple indirect effects. At the same time, 
the simplicity of this approach is its main advantage over the first two approaches. Unlike the 
quantitative evaluation of a country’s regulatory framework, the performance-metric approach 
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does not require access to the countries detailed regulatory frameworks and their evolution. The 
greatest advantage of the performance-metric over the general equilibrium models is that it does 
not require detailed hypotheses on all the transmission mechanisms mediating the effects that 
have been analysed. Therefore, the results of the total effects on performance metrics are not 
dependent on those hypotheses.  
Taking into account the limitations of the first two approaches, the general framework provided 
by the third approach has been used in this paper. This framework is deemed suitable to address 
the issues raised in the introduction as well as to capture the flexibility required by the diversity 
of contexts in which the effect of electricity regulation is to be assessed. Several regulatory 
variables have been considered as key drivers of electricity consumption, the focus of this paper 
is on the two specific regulated components of the electricity retail price. This choice is motivated 
by their weight in the retail electricity price, and consequently, the potential relevance of their 
impact on electricity consumption. On average for the 22 European countries included in our 
sample, during the period 2007-2013 the promotion costs related to the support for RES-E and 
the network costs represented respectively 11% and 23% of the retail price faced by industrial 
consumers (own calculations based on Eurostat and CEER). In the context of this study, given that 
the mechanism through which regulation affects consumption is via the regulated components 
of the retail price, a negative relationship is expected between the regulatory variables and 
electricity consumption. 
2.2. Electricity consumption and growth 
The relationship between electricity consumption and economic growth has been extensively 
analysed in the empirical literature. Understanding the links and the direction of causality 
between these two variables has important implications for the design of energy and 
environmental policies.  
As recent reviews of the literature show (Payne, 2010; Otzurk, 2010), in spite of the huge number 
of contributions to the analysis of the relationship between electricity consumption and growth 
there is not a consensus  with respect to the direction of the effects nor the magnitude of that 
effect. This lack of consensus in the empirical literature is due to the differences in energy 
consumption patterns, different countries characteristics regarding their stage of development, 
and institutional aspects, heterogeneity in climate conditions and the time period chosen for the 
studies (Payne, 2010; Ozturk, 2010). 
7 
 
The multiplicity of results gives support to different hypotheses. More specifically, this 
relationship can be synthesized into four testable hypotheses (Payne, 2010): 
The first one, in the context of a Granger-causality approach, is “the growth hypothesis”. This 
hypothesis is based on the idea that energy, together with labour and capital, is a main driver of 
economic growth. It is supported if an increase in energy consumption causes an increase in the 
real gross domestic product (GDP). A main policy implication would be that energy conservation 
policies could have a negative effect on economic growth 
On the other hand, “the conservation hypothesis” is supported if an increase in real GDP causes 
an increase in energy consumption. This would imply that energy conservation policies, such as 
greenhouse emission reductions, efficiency improvement measures or management policies 
whose aim is to reduce energy consumption would not adversely affect real GDP. 
Regarding the third theory, “the neutrality hypothesis”, the absence of Granger-causality is 
assumed. Energy consumption is regarded as a small component of real GDP or it is not correlated 
with GDP and therefore its change should not have a significant impact on economic growth. In 
this case, energy policies are not expected to affect economic growth. 
Finally, “the feedback hypothesis”, suggests that energy consumption and real GDP are jointly 
determined and may serve as complements to one another. This approach is supported 
statistically when there is evidence of bi-directional Granger-causality. Again, policies that foster 
efficiency in energy consumption may not adversely affect real GDP. 
To sum up, the literature review suggests that, whereas a negative effect of energy regulation on 
electricity consumption can be expected, the final effect on economic growth is not conclusive 
and it is a matter of empirical analysis. The surveys of the empirical literature on the electricity 
consumption-growth nexus have emphasized the convenience of using multivariate models and 
to support the empirical analysis on well-established theoretical frameworks to include all the 
relevant control variables. Therefore, our empirical estimations are based on the theory of 
economic growth (Solow, 1956; Romer, 1990) that provides a formal framework for the analysis 
of the determinants of growth and the ensuing effects on electricity consumption. 
In this framework, a conventional neoclassical production function, we include together with 
electricity consumption the stock of capital and employment, the two main inputs of production. 
Therefore, we treat them as separate inputs with the purpose of analysing the relationship 
between electricity consumption and an aggregate measure of output, such as gross domestic 
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product. This relationship can be affected, like energy use, by substitution between energy and 
other inputs, technological change, shifts in the composition of outputs and also by shifts in the 
mix of other inputs (Stern, 2011). This augmented function has been used in many analyses with 
electricity or energy consumption to estimate the causal relationship between energy 
consumption and growth and to avoid an omitted variable bias issue (Stern, 1993 and 2000; 
Apergis and Payne, 2010).1  
3. MODEL, VARIABLES AND METHODS 
The approach to estimate the impact of electricity regulation on growth is based on the theory of 
economic growth and on the relationship between electricity consumption and growth. In the 
framework of growth theory, the contribution of production factors to economic growth is 
analysed. In our empirical strategy we go one step further than the more traditional literature 
performing time-series analysis on the relationship between growth and electricity consumption 
(e.g. cointegration2). By means of a multivariate panel-regression modelling, we have better 
control of potential omitted variables and make the most of the panel dimension in our database. 
In our empirical analysis it is assumed, as has been pointed out above, that electricity regulation 
potentially affects economic growth through its impact on electricity consumption. 
Therefore, we use a system of two equations that is estimated in two stages. The first stage of 
the econometric model captures the impact of electricity regulation on electricity consumption, 
controlling for the other observable factors that affect this consumption (Eq. 1). In particular, our 
purpose is to analyse the effects of renewable energy promotion costs and industrial networks 
costs. The second stage captures the impact of electricity consumption (the estimated value from 
the first stage) on economic growth, controlling for the other observable factors of production 
(capital and employment) which have a direct impact on economic growth (Eq. 2).  
 
 
                                                          
1 The relationship between growth and electricity consumption has also been shown with other 
approaches. Henderson et al. (2012) analyse the usefulness of using satellite data on night lights as a proxy 
for economic activity and shows that light growth is a very useful proxy for GDP growth. 
2 Regarding this relationship, two or more cross-sectional time series are cointegrated if they share a 
common stochastic drift, and only integrated variables can be cointegrated. We performed two tests, the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) and the Phillips–Perron (PP) test (Phillips–
Perron, 1988), both under the null hypothesis of a unit root (integration of first order). The results for both 
tests confirmed that the series were not integrated in levels and, hence, that it was not necessary to test 




𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝑅𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑡 + 31𝑖𝑡  (1) 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠̂ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 32𝑖𝑡              (2) 
 
where a full description of the variables and its sources are provided in Table 1. In order to carry 
out the empirical estimation, a dataset for the period 2007-2013 and 22 European countries has 
been compiled based on EUROSTAT database and CEER reports. The information for 22 countries 
and 7 years allows us to have an appropriate panel of data in order to apply panel-data models, 
which have substantial advantages with respect to estimation techniques which use cross-section 
data, including the capacity to control for individual heterogeneity, a greater degree of freedom 
and a greater variability.  
- INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE- 
The regulatory variable capturing the promotion costs related to the support for RES-E, 
Renewable Promotion Costs (RPC), is worth mentioning. Unlike all other variables used in this 
analysis, the information required to identify the impact of renewable electricity support costs is 
not directly available in a standardized public or private database. This novel variable, based on 
the information provided by the Council of European Energy Regulators reports (CEER 2011, 2013, 
2015), was built as follows. First, the total expenditures on RES-E promotion were calculated as 
the product of the RES-E weighted average support level by technology (from CEER reports) 
multiplied by the overall RES-E production (from EUROSTAT). Then, the Renewable Promotion 
Cost (RPC) was calculated as the ratio between the total expenditure on RES-E promotion and the 
total electricity consumption (from EUROSTAT). Therefore, the resulting variable is measured in 
€/MWh units. This variable permits the degree of these regulated costs to be captured taking into 
account the size of the electricity system (in terms of MWh of electricity generation), which 
facilitates cross-country comparisons. Table 2 provides the summary of the descriptive statistics 
for this and the other variables used in this study. 
- INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE- 
Table 3 contains the correlation matrix which provides relevant information on the relationship 
between the variables included in our model. This correlation matrix helped us to reject the 
presence of multicollineality which could arise if there was a high correlation between the 
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explanatory variables. Therefore, it has been useful to develop the specification of the model to 
perform the empirical analysis. 
- INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE- 
The empirical estimation is performed using the aforementioned database through the 
implementation of the following panel data econometric techniques. In the first stage, the 
consumption equation (Eq. 1) is estimated with the Arellano-Bond method for dynamic panel 
data. This allows us to avoid the potential bias coming from the endogeneity which a dynamic 
process generally features. The estimated values of electricity consumption, capturing the 
estimated effects of regulation (RPC and NC), are recovered and stored. In the second stage, the 
estimated values of the first stage are introduced into the growth equation (Eq. 2). It is then 
estimated with fixed effect panel data techniques. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Tables 4 and 5 show the results of the estimations of the two equations used to assess the effects 
of the two regulations, renewable energy promotion costs and industrial network cost, on 
electricity consumption and GDP.  
- INSERT TABLES 4 & 5 AROUND HERE- 
The results for the effects of the two regulations on electricity consumption and GDP show the 
expected negative sign, are statistically significant and their magnitudes are reasonable. In both 
cases we are assuming, as we explained in the description of the model, that the impact on GDP 
takes place through the effects on electricity consumption. Renewable promotion costs and 
network costs caused an increase in the electricity prices that, as our estimations show, have a 
negative effect on electricity consumption. Our results of the estimation of the growth equation 
support the “growth hypothesis” regarding the relation between electricity consumption and 
growth. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that energy, together with labour and capital, 
is a factor of production and a driver of economic growth. Therefore, the reduction of electricity 
consumption negatively affects economic growth with a decrease in GDP levels.  
These estimations therefore allow for the assessment of these two regulatory instruments and 
give a proper estimation of their quantitative effects on levels of GDP. Nevertheless, our analysis 
focuses only on the direct effects of regulation on electricity consumption and GDP and does not 
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consider other possible, indirect effects that, for instance, the promotion of renewable energies 
may have on technological innovation and potentially on economic growth. 
The estimation of the elasticities regarding the effects of renewable energy promotion costs 
presented in Table 6 shows that an increase of 1% in these costs leads to a decrease of 0.03% in 
electricity consumption and a reduction of 0.006% in  GDP  which, in absolute terms, means a 
28.6M€ decrease. Departing from the assumption that there are not any additional regulatory 
changes during the period, the long-run elasticities are, as expected, lower, although only slightly 
than the short-term elasticities.  
- INSERT TABLE 6 AROUND HERE- 
The parameter of the estimations of the other regulatory variable, the network cost, are also 
negative (see Table 7). The estimations of the elasticities show that an increase of 1% in these 
costs leads to a decrease of 0.06% in electricity consumption and of 0.01% in GDP. In absolute 
terms this means a reduction of 55.8M€. Again, long-term elasticities are slightly lower than the 
short-term. 
- INSERT TABLE 7 AROUND HERE- 
The comparison of both regulatory instruments shows that in relative terms the quantitative 
effects on GDP are higher for network costs than for renewable promotion costs. Nevertheless, 
caution is needed in this comparison because they are significantly different in monetary terms, 
with the effects from a 1% increase in network costs being higher than from a 1% increase in 
renewable promotion costs.  
Besides, while a 1% increase in the network costs is on average equivalent to 0.29€/MWh, the 
same increase in the renewables promotion costs is on average equivalent to 0.14€/MWh. 
Therefore, when comparing the results from the two regulated variables, these are in line with 
the expectations, given the estimated elasticities and their average values.    
Finally, the results corresponding to the control variables included in both equations, needed to 
avoid the omitted variables problem, and to ensure that we obtain causal relationships between 
regulatory variables and growth, are all statistically significant and show the expected signs. In 
the two estimations, corresponding to renewable promotion costs and network costs, the 
variables of the growth equation (employment, capital and productivity trend) have positive 
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values. In addition, in electricity consumption a greater participation of energy intensive sectors 
has a positive effect on electricity consumption while higher energy costs have a negative effect 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This paper focuses on the effects of electricity regulation on economic growth through its impact 
on electricity consumption. Although there is an extensive literature analysing the relationship 
between energy consumption and economic growth, the analysis carried out in this paper 
introduces several novelties. First, to the best of our knowledge, there is no study that has 
estimated the specific effects of electricity regulation on economic growth, taking into account 
their effects on electricity consumption. Second, the paper considers two different instruments 
to disentangle the effects of regulation on growth: renewable promotion costs and network costs. 
Third, the renewable promotion costs have been calculated in a standardized way to allow cross-
country comparison.  
In our analysis we have examined the relationship between electricity regulation and economic 
growth through the effect that regulation has on the consumption of electricity. In our 
estimations we have included other variables, such as the participation of intensive energy 
sectors or the stock of capital that may mediate this relationship. Nevertheless, in this analysis 
we have focused specifically on the potential effects of electricity regulation on growth. Although 
this is an important area, the linkages between electricity regulation and growth are complex and 
may be affected by different variables, such as investment in capital goods, in innovation, and 
also by different aspects of the behaviour of firms and consumers that would be convenient to 
take into account for a comprehensive analysis of these linkages.  Despite these limitations, our 
analysis provides, as pointed out above some novelties and contributes to shed some light on the 
importance of well- designed electricity regulation and provides some relevant policy 
implications. 
The main results of the analysis show, as expected, that the effect of regulatory cost on electricity 
consumption is negative. In addition, the final effect on economic growth according to the 
estimations of the empirical analysis, is also negative. Hence, an increase in the regulated cost 
leads to a decrease in electricity consumption and to a reduction of GDP. The empirical results 
support “the growth hypothesis” regarding the relationship between electricity consumption and 
economic growth.       
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A main economic implication from these results is that any decrease in electricity consumption, 
through energy conservation policies, could have a negative effect on economic growth. 
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that a reduction in energy consumption may allow for an 
increase in disposable income to be spent on other products and services positively affecting 
economic growth. In addition, there are other indirect effects that are not covered by our analysis, 
so it is necessary to be prudent with our conclusions. It should also be highlighted that this by no 
means contradicts some recent reports (i.e. IEA, 2016) which suggest that CO2 emissions are 
decoupled from economic growth at the world level. Taking into account that a close  relationship 
between electricity consumption and growth is observed, increased  decoupling of growth and 
CO2 emissions is possible if electricity demand is increasingly covered with RES-E (as suggested 
by IEA, 2016) or if CCS technologies improve. 
In addition, there are regulatory implications, in the sense that any regulation increasing the price 
of energy will have a negative effect on economic growth. This is an important message for 
regulators and policy makers involved in the design of regulatory measures affecting prices. It 
also allows for the use of regulation as a tool to promote economic growth. This is in contrast to 
what is advocated by some authors in terms of the use of energy taxes on electricity prices as a 
superior option to promoting energy efficiency (Filipovic et al., 2015).   
The effect of the regulatory cost on prices seems to indicate that a revision of the current 
framework is required. These results reinforce the need to search for market-based regulatory 
mechanisms that would potentially generate less disruption on prices. This idea is in line with the 
approach that has been taken by the EC in the most recent energy policy proposal package “Clean 
energy for all Europeans” (EC, 2016). The Commission sought to transform the energy regulatory 
framework, emphasising the predominant role that market-based instruments should have in this 
sector. 
The changes implemented during recent years by several European countries in renewable 
promotion mechanisms are clear examples of an increasing market approach. Moving from Feed-
in Tariff to Feed-in Premium or to an auctioning system it is intended to reduce the burden on 
promotion costs. Another alternative in the case of renewable promotion cost is to avoid 
financing climate policy through the price of energy, for instance by using funds from the public 
budget. This would simultaneously profit society from the indirect benefits related to renewable 
deployment and innovation, while increasing potential growth through a direct effect on 
electricity prices.  
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The case of network costs is more complex. Given their natural monopoly features, network costs 
are traditionally covered through regulated fees. An alternative approach could be to implement 
innovative solutions allowing for cost reductions, while keeping the competitiveness and 
investment levels of the companies that are managing the networks, hence, maintaining or 
increasing the quality of service. For instance, given the economic and environmental costs of 
electricity losses (Davi-Arderius et al. 2017), measures to decrease losses could reduce the impact 
on prices related to network cost.  In this regard, some options include  increasing efficiency in 
distribution network management through a more active role of DSOs or linking payments to  the 
operator’s ability to introduce innovation -for instance in the deployment of smart grids. In 
addition, higher network efficiency could be promoted in the transmission level encouraging the 
cross-border interconnection that is expected to increase price convergence as well as the 
number of players in the markets. Finally, measures that promote conveniently located 
Distributed Generation could help to solve grid congestion problems and partially avoid the new 
investment required.  
From the results of the paper, we infer that electricity regulation needs some help to moderate 
the estimated negative impact that is caused to growth through prices. Policy makers should 
carefully assess the effects the existing and new regulation can have on growth. Furthermore, 
complementary policies that moderate those effects and are able to introduce additional 
economic incentive should be looked for. 
To alleviate the impact on economic growth that lower energy consumption generates a series of 
policy measures needs to be undertaken to promote energy efficiency. The benefits of energy 
efficiency policies are multiple affecting everything from macroeconomic performance, 
environment and industry to energy prices (IEA, 2015). As is stated in the Energy Efficiency 
Directive proposal recently launched by the European Commission, energy efficiency is 
considered to trigger growth, job creation and investment (EC, 2016). In this sense, promoting 
energy efficiency will have positive spillovers on job creation and demand for new appliances and 
services creating an indirect impact on economic growth. For instance, one recent paper that 
explores the effects of energy efficiency on economic growth (Bataille & Melton, 2017) shows 
increases in GDP, employment and welfare. In addition, promoting energy efficiency will allow 
for the decoupling of economic growth and energy consumption thereby reducing the energy 
intensity of the economy. Less energy needed per unit of output clearly helps to minimize the 
negative impact of regulation can have on energy prices and consequently on economic growth. 
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However, governments should be cautious with policy implementation because energy efficiency 
could jeopardize the expected positive outcome through a rebound effect. 
What may be concluded from this paper is that regulatory design should target an efficient 
allocation of resources, minimizing the effect on prices. Given the positive relationship between 
electricity consumption and economic growth found in this empirical study, a regulatory policy 
increasingly reliant  on market mechanisms should be designed and implemented, in order to 
achieve the regional objectives for renewables, energy efficiency and CO2 reduction. These 
market mechanisms could be expected to contain regulatory costs to promote renewables -and 
other costs from policies aiming at energy efficiency or CO2 mitigation. In the case of networks 
there is potential for cost containment with the development of innovative regulatory solutions. 
Nevertheless, any regulatory change should not harm the competitiveness of the sector or its 
operators, and should not risk the achievement of the energy and environmental targets of 
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Table 1. The variables. Definitions and sources 
Variable Definition Source of 
data 




Final energy consumption-electricity (MWh) Eurostat 
Economic growth (GDP) Gross domestic product (Billions €) Eurostat 
RES-E promotion costs 
(RPC) 
RES-E promotion cost (€/MWh) CEER, Own 
Network costs -industrial 
(NC) 
Transmission and distribution tariffs; 
transmission and distribution losses; after-
sale services; system service costs and meter 
rental.  (€/MWh) 
Eurostat 
Energy cost (EC)  Wholesale Cost and Retail Margin for 
Industrial Consumers  
Eurostat 
Intensive energy sectors 
(IS) 
Energy intensive sectors activity (percentage 
of economic activity) (€/MWh) 
Eurostat 
 Equation 2  
Economic growth (GDP) 
(dependent variable) 
Gross domestic product (Billions €) Eurostat 
Employment (EMP) Number of employees. Total economy (1000 
persons) 
Eurostat 
Capital (K) Net capital stock, constant prices.  
Total economy (2010 prices) 
Eurostat 






Final energy consumption-electricity (MWh) – 
Estimated values from first stage 
Eurostat 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP 252 463.92 700.00 5.96 2,681.59 
PT 224 101.67 3.91 92.41 117.52 
K 224 1,271.94 2,177.88 0.74 7,845.83 
EMP 224 8,081.55 10,448.78 153.51 42,226.00 
Econs 196 100,189,224.49 134,899,234.89 1,707,000.00 532,424,000.00 
RPC 154 14.36 10.63 0.50 55.29 
EC 180 68.58 27.88 26.90 201.20 
NC 180 28.95 10.83 3.50 72.40 






Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
 
GDP PT K EMP Econs RPC EC NC IS 
GDP 1.000         
PT -0.092 1.000        
K 0.986 -0.095 1.000       
EMP 0.962 -0.087 0.937 1.000      
Econs 0.986 -0.107 0.963 0.965 1.000     
RPC 0.271 -0.109 0.315 0.250 0.267 1.000    
EC 0.378 -0.286 0.419 0.359 0.337 0.324 1.000   
NC -0.225 0.184 -0.247 -0.142 -0.235 -0.077 -0.329 1.000  




Table 4. Estimations results. First stage: Electricity consumption equation 

















Number of id 22 
Pseudo R2 0.5474 
 
Table 5. Estimations results. Second stage: Growth equation 



















Table 6. Elasticities of consumption and growth to renewable energy promotion costs 
 Consumption Growth 
Short-run Elasticity in % -0.032 -0.006 
Short-run Effect in MWh & M€ -32,207 -28.63 
Long-run Elasticity in % -0.026 -0.005 
Long-run Effect in MWh & M€ -26,291 -23.37 
 
Table 7. Elasticities of consumption and growth to network costs  
 
Consumption Growth 
Short-run Elasticity in % -0.063 -0.012 
Short-run Effect in MWh & M€ -62,731 -55.77 
Long-run Elasticity in % -0.051 -0.010 






Table A1. Unit root tests for GDP and ECONS 
Variable Statistic ADF (p-value) PP (p-value) 
GDP Inverse Chi-squared 2,65628E-09 0,007609123 
  Inverse Normal 2,832E-06 0,009314395 
  Inverse Logit 7,03071E-08 0,008937038 
  Modified inv. chi-squared 4,44089E-16 0,003151377 
Econs Inverse Chi-squared 2,32213E-38 3,63143E-18 
  Inverse Normal 1,89146E-14 5,05593E-09 
  Inverse Logit 0 4,26326E-14 
  Modified inv. chi-squared 0 0 
 
 
